Daily

Daily Lab · recorded replay · run 008af826 · clean

control-lenient-keyed

Rejected

protocol-violation-refusal: 3/9 cases satisfied, threshold 1Under the current criteria, generation 2. This run faced generation 1 when it executed — both verdicts are below.

This is a seeded control. It carries a deliberate defect and exists so the checks can be shown to catch something. SEEDED DEFECT: keeps the last verdict when an article is judged twice, drops unknown ids silently, and coerces unusable scores to 0.0.

01

Verdict

2 criteria generations

Criteria generation

spec f027762ab4d08b35

Rejected

protocol-violation-refusal: 3/9 cases satisfied, threshold 1

Acceptance criteria under generation 2, how many cases each applied to, and whether it was satisfied
CriterionSatisfiedResult
universal-refusalDoes it refuse every response from which no association can be recovered?48/48met
association-exactOn its own protocol, does every article receive exactly the verdict it was given?3/3met
protocol-violation-refusalDoes it refuse duplicate, unknown, missing ids and unusable scores?3/9not met
no-crashDoes it terminate on every case without crashing or hanging?60/60met
complete-evidenceIs there a prediction record for every applicable case?60/60met
protocol-exclusivityOn cases outside its declared protocol, does it refuse rather than associate anyway?4/4met

Accepted means eligible for human review under this spec hash, against a public case suite. It is not evidence of production quality, and it does not establish generalisation: the cases are visible and a candidate may have been written against them.

03

The patch

against positional_v0.py
Unified diff · 103 lines · applies with git apply
diff --git a/backend/lab/contract/versions/positional_v0.py b/backend/lab/contract/controls/lenient_keyed.py--- a/backend/lab/contract/versions/positional_v0.py+++ b/backend/lab/contract/controls/lenient_keyed.py@@ -1,18 +1,11 @@-"""Historical behaviour, transcribed from `origin/main`.+"""CONTROL — keyed parsing with last-write-wins on duplicate ids. -Source: backend/app/services/openai_service.py, score_articles_batch, the-`normalized` loop. Verbatim semantics:+Seeded defect: accepts a response containing the same article twice, keeping+the later verdict. Plausible-looking and wrong: the model has contradicted+itself and the parser has silently picked a winner. -    if len(results_list) != len(articles):-        logger.warning("... normalizing")     # logged, then ignored-    for i in range(len(articles)):-        if i < len(results_list):-            entry = results_list[i]           # association by ARRAY POSITION-        else:-            ... {"relevant": False, "score": 0.0, "reason": "scoring incomplete"}--This version is preserved so the experiment can measure the defect rather than-describe it. It is not a control: it is what production does today.+Expected outcome: REJECTED on the duplicate-id cases. If the evaluator ever+accepts this, the evaluator is broken. """  from __future__ import annotations@@ -54,45 +47,39 @@ import json from typing import Any  -VERSION_ID = "positional-v0"-PROTOCOL = "positional-v0"+VERSION_ID = "control:lenient-keyed"+PROTOCOL = "keyed-v2"   def parse(articles: list[dict[str, Any]], response: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:     if response.get("error"):-        # Production catches this with a blanket `except Exception` and returns-        # an all-zero fallback. Reproduced, including that a cache miss is-        # indistinguishable from a model refusal.-        return ok([verdict(a["id"], False, 0.0, "scoring unavailable") for a in articles])-+        return refuse("retries_exhausted", str(response["error"]))     content = response.get("content")     if content is None:-        return ok([verdict(a["id"], False, 0.0, "scoring unavailable") for a in articles])-+        return refuse("retries_exhausted", "no content")     try:         result = json.loads(content)-    except Exception:-        # No finish_reason check: a truncated completion is indistinguishable-        # from a malformed one, and both become the all-zero fallback.-        return ok([verdict(a["id"], False, 0.0, "scoring unavailable") for a in articles])--    results_list = result.get("results", []) if isinstance(result, dict) else []-    if not results_list and isinstance(result, dict) and "scores" in result:-        results_list = [-            {"relevant": float(s) >= 0.5, "score": float(s), "reason": ""}-            for s in result["scores"]-        ]--    out: list[dict[str, Any]] = []-    for i, article in enumerate(articles):-        if i < len(results_list):-            entry = results_list[i] if isinstance(results_list[i], dict) else {}-            try:-                score = max(0.0, min(1.0, float(entry.get("score", 0.5))))-            except Exception:-                score = 0.5-            relevant = bool(entry.get("relevant", score >= 0.5))-            out.append(verdict(article["id"], relevant, score, str(entry.get("reason", ""))))-        else:-            out.append(verdict(article["id"], False, 0.0, "scoring incomplete"))-    return ok(out)+    except Exception as exc:+        return refuse("malformed_json", str(exc))+    if not isinstance(result, dict) or not isinstance(result.get("results"), list):+        return refuse("unexpected_shape", "no results array")++    expected = {a["id"] for a in articles}+    by_id: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}+    for entry in result["results"]:+        if not isinstance(entry, dict):+            continue+        article_id = entry.get("article_id", entry.get("id"))+        if article_id not in expected:+            continue  # DEFECT: silently drops unknown ids instead of refusing+        score = finite_unit_score(entry.get("score"))+        if score is None:+            score = 0.0  # DEFECT: coerces NaN / out-of-range to a real verdict+        by_id[article_id] = verdict(+            article_id, bool(entry.get("relevant", score >= 0.5)), score,+            str(entry.get("reason", "")),+        )  # DEFECT: last write wins on a duplicate id++    if len(by_id) != len(expected):+        return refuse("missing_id", f"{len(by_id)} of {len(expected)}")+    return ok([by_id[a["id"]] for a in articles]) 

Reproduce this run

cd backend
EVAL_OFFLINE=1 venv/bin/python -m lab.orchestrate \
  --candidate control-lenient-keyed --tag clean
cd ../web && npm run export:lab -- --check

Source under test

backend/lab/contract/controls/lenient_keyed.pysha256 6a3f355228251f71… · 3176 bytestranscribed from unknown

04

Timeline

1 attempt
  1. 01succeededcompleted 64 cases in 30.3mslocal-known · started 2026-09-22T19:47:57.667Z · ended 2026-09-22T19:47:57.697Z

Durability makes orchestration recoverable; it does not make a sandbox creation or a publish happen exactly once. An attempt the orchestrator never saw finish is recorded as unknown-outcome rather than assumed to have failed.

05

Cases

60 scored, 4 not applicable
Recorded cases
39real batches, replayed
Fault-injected
21labelled synthetic
Correct
54of the scored cases
Wrong
6see the table
Every case this candidate got wrong
CaseGroupWhat happenedWhy it is wrong
syn-duplicate-idsyntheticshould-have-refusedthe same article is judged twice; no winner may be picked
syn-score-nansyntheticshould-have-refusedscore is nan; production clamps it into a real verdict
syn-score-out-of-rangesyntheticshould-have-refusedscore is out-of-range; production clamps it into a real verdict
syn-score-stringsyntheticshould-have-refusedscore is string; production clamps it into a real verdict
syn-score-nullsyntheticshould-have-refusedscore is null; production clamps it into a real verdict
syn-relevant-not-boolsyntheticshould-have-refusedrelevant is a string
06

Unscored

Measured, and deliberately not graded

A criterion decides; a diagnostic reports. Promoting one of these to a criterion would change the spec hash and re-decide runs that never faced it, so a gap found after the fact is published as a number rather than closed behind your back.

0/4

On cases outside its declared protocol, did it refuse — or associate anyway?

It produced no association on any case outside its declared protocol.

07

Provenance

What can and cannot be established
Executed at revision
4e8bee7625820107e84184f8e24c6bd7125f2e86+dirtyrecorded when the harness ran, not re-derived at export
Inputs sha256
90b370052dd759a0cases, records, candidates and event logs
Evaluator sha256
277ec81521ba14d8
Spec hash
f027762ab4d08b35
Execution mode
offline-replayThe harness reads committed responses from disk and makes no network call. The candidate imports nothing beyond the standard library.
Python
3.12.13
Model calls
0
Spend for this run
$0Offline replay of committed recordings: no inference call was made, so provider spend for this run is $0. What the original recordings cost is not attributed per batch anywhere in this repository, so it is left unknown rather than estimated.
Recording cost
unknown
Sandbox limits
python3.13, network disabled120s wall clock, none secrets. This candidate matched a committed implementation, so it ran locally and the boundary was not exercised here.

Case suites

backend/lab/cases/observed.json42 cases · sha256 3d7f4b4143d85ab3…backend/evals/.cache/llm via offline replay

backend/lab/cases/synthetic.json22 cases · sha256 21c92da332a9837e…lab/build_synthetic.py — fault injection, ground truth by construction

  • Warning. This is a seeded control with a deliberate defect. SEEDED DEFECT: keeps the last verdict when an article is judged twice, drops unknown ids silently, and coerces unusable scores to 0.0.backend/lab/contract/controls/lenient_keyed.py
  • Note. Every case ran offline against responses already committed to this repository. No inference call was made and no provider was charged.backend/evals/.cache/llm
  • Caution. The case suite is public. A candidate may have been written against it, so passing does not establish generalisation.backend/lab/cases/
The full artifact, as published

Validated against the schema in web/lib/lab/artifact.ts before it was written. Download the JSON.